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R. v. Ferguson and the Search for a 
Coherent Approach to Mandatory 
Minimum Sentences under Section 12 
Lisa Dufraimont* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Among the difficult problems facing Canadian courts under the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 is the challenge of dealing 
with legislation that can be constitutionally applied in the great majority 
of cases but infringes Charter rights in a few cases. One potential 
solution to this problem, which has frequently been raised since the early 
days of the Charter, is a constitutional exemption.2 Using this remedy, a 
court could uphold the legislation but exempt an individual from an 
application of the law that would violate his or her Charter rights.3 The 
possibility of a constitutional exemption has most often been raised in 
the context of the section 12 guarantee against “cruel and unusual 
treatment or punishment”. It is argued that mandatory sentencing 
provisions that apply validly in the general run of cases result in cruel 
and unusual punishment in the unique circumstances of certain 
offenders.4  
For many years the status of such constitutional exemptions was 
uncertain. The Supreme Court of Canada endorsed a “narrow” version of 
the remedy exempting an individual Charter applicant from the 
                                                                                                             
*
 Queen’s University, Faculty of Law. 
1
 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
2
 For a detailed history of the idea of constitutional exemptions under the Charter, see 
Peter Sankoff, “Constitutional Exemptions: Myth or Reality?” (1999-2000) 11 N.C.J.L. 411, at 416-
29. 
3
 See, e.g., Kent Roach, Constitutional Remedies in Canada, looseleaf (Aurora, ON: 
Canada Law Book, 2006), at para. 14.560 [hereinafter “Roach”]. 
4
 For example, this argument for a constitutional exemption was raised unsuccessfully in 
R. v. Latimer, [2001] S.C.J. No. 1, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Latimer”], where the 
defence contended that the mandatory minimum sentence for second degree murder constituted 
cruel and unusual punishment in the circumstances. 
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application of a law that had been struck down during the period that the 
declaration of invalidity was suspended.5 Some argue that the Supreme 
Court occasionally, albeit implicitly, accepted constitutional exemptions 
in a broader form by upholding the validity of statutory provisions while 
declining to apply them or limiting their application in particular 
circumstances.6 Clearly, though, the Supreme Court never explicitly 
acknowledged that constitutional exemptions exist as a Charter remedy 
outside the discrete context of suspended declarations of invalidity. As 
controversy raged around this important remedial question,7 Canada’s 
highest Court repeatedly declined to decide the issue.8 Thus, the idea that 
a statutory provision could be upheld under the Charter but that 
exemptions could be granted to individuals whose rights were 
unconstitutionally affected found explicit approval only in the judgments 
of lower courts9 and in the minority positions of individual Supreme 
                                                                                                             
5
 See Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] S.C.J. No. 24, 
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 203, at para. 22 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Corbiere”]; Peter Sankoff, “Constitutional 
Exemptions: An Ongoing Problem Requiring a Swift Resolution” (2003) 36 U.B.C. L. Rev. 231, at 
233 [hereinafter “Sankoff, ‘Swift Resolution’”] (contrasting the “narrow” form of constitutional 
exemption, which applies only during a suspended declaration of invalidity, with the “broad” form 
of exemption that allows a statutory provision to be upheld but permits rare individuals to be 
exempted from its application). 
6
 In Steele v. Mountain Institution, [1990] S.C.J. No. 111, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1385 (S.C.C.), 
the Court held that the indefinite incarceration of a sex offender constituted cruel and unusual 
punishment on the facts of the case, even though the dangerous offender provisions permitting 
indefinite incarceration were constitutionally valid. It has been argued that the remedy in Steele 
amounted to a constitutional exemption. See Allan Manson, “Motivation, the Supreme Court and 
Mandatory Sentencing for Murder” (2001) 39 C.R. (5th) 65, at 69; R. v. Kumar, [1993] B.C.J. No. 
2266, 85 C.C.C. (3d) 417, at para. 37 (B.C.C.A.). The case of R. v. Rose, [1998] S.C.J. No. 81, 
[1998] 3 S.C.R. 262 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Rose”] has also been cited as an instance where the Court 
implicitly recognized a constitutional exemption. See Allan Manson, “The Claim of the Rose Case: 
Jury Addresses and Humble Echoes of Reply” (1999) 20 C.R. (5th) 300, at 301; Peter Sankoff & 
Ursula Hendel, “Creating a Right of Reply: Rose is Not Without a Few Thorns” (1999) 20 C.R. 
(5th) 305, at 312; Roach, supra, note 3, at para. 14.667.  
7
 Among commentators favouring the use of constitutional exemptions, especially under  
s. 12, were Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 
2007), vol. 2, at 53-11 and Roach, supra, note 3, at paras. 14.600, 14.630, 14.660. Critics of 
constitutional exemptions included Morris Rosenberg & Stéphane Perrault, “Ifs and Buts in Charter 
Adjudication: The Unruly Emergence of Constitutional Exemptions in Canada” (2002) 16 S.C.L.R. 
(2d) 375. 
8
 See, e.g., Latimer, supra, note 4 (finding that a constitutional exemption was unavailable 
to the accused, but leaving undecided whether such a remedy could be available in another case); 
Corbiere, supra, note 5, at para. 22; R. v. Seaboyer; R. v. Gayme, [1991] S.C.J. No. 62, 66 C.C.C. 
(3d) 321, at 404 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Seaboyer”]. 
9
 The leading case imposing a constitutional exemption was R. v. Chief, [1989] Y.J. No. 
131, 51 C.C.C. (3d) 265, at 278-79 (Y.T.C.A.). For a full review of lower court decisions both 
endorsing and rejecting the use of constitutional exemptions, see Sankoff, “Swift Resolution”, 
supra, note 5, at 253-58. 
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Court judges.10 The Supreme Court’s long-standing reticence on this 
issue introduced an undesirable level of uncertainty into Charter 
adjudication.11  
Recently in R. v. Ferguson,12 a unanimous Supreme Court held that 
“a constitutional exemption is not an appropriate remedy for a s. 12 
violation.”13 Ferguson has provided some long-awaited answers about 
the availability of constitutional exemptions. At the same time, one 
should not overestimate the extent to which Ferguson has resolved the 
deeper controversies animating the constitutional exemptions debate. 
The case concerned constitutional exemptions from mandatory minimum 
sentences. It is unclear to what extent it can be taken as authority that 
constitutional exemptions are unavailable as a remedy outside of section 
12.14  
Even within the section 12 context, Ferguson has raised as many 
questions as it has answered. The judgment addressed the issue of 
constitutional exemptions in isolation from the larger section 12 
analysis, when what is needed is an integrated and coherent approach to 
this Charter guarantee.15 By sidestepping the larger issues about the 
application of section 12 to mandatory minimum sentences, the Court 
left unresolved the basic problem presented in the case: how are courts 
to deal with sentencing provisions that operate constitutionally in most 
cases but have unconstitutional effects in rare cases? Ferguson has 
established that constitutional exemptions are not the answer, but what 
the answer might be is far from clear. I will argue that Ferguson raises 
the unsettling possibility that section 12 provides little protection to 
                                                                                                             
10
 See R. v. Morrisey, [2000] S.C.J. No. 39, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90, at para. 94 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Morrisey”], per Arbour J., concurring (“In cases of manslaughter involving the use of 
a firearm and arising from criminal negligence causing death, I believe that the better approach is to 
read the mandatory minimum as applicable in all cases save those in which it would be 
unconstitutional to do so.”); Rose, supra, note 6, at para. 66, per L’Heureux-Dubé J., concurring 
(“Section 24(1) of the Charter, however, enables a Court to grant a constitutional exemption from 
legislation that is constitutional in its general application if in the circumstances of a particular case 
an unconstitutional result would otherwise occur.”).  
11
 See especially Sankoff, “Swift Resolution”, supra, note 5. 
12
 [2008] S.C.J. No. 6, 2008 SCC 6 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ferguson”]. 
13
 Id., at para. 2. 
14
 See Stephen Coughlan, “The End of Constitutional Exemptions” 54 C.R. (6th) 220 
(acknowledging that Ferguson is unclear on this point and arguing that the Supreme Court should 
decide that its rejection of constitutional exemptions applies outside of s. 12). 
15
 On the need to address s. 12 in an integrated way, see Sankoff, “Swift Resolution”, 
supra, note 5, at 242-44; Allan Manson, “Morrisey: Observations on Criminal Negligence and s. 12 
Methodology” (2000) 36 C.R. (5th) 121. 
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individuals whose exceptional circumstances render the application of a 
mandatory minimum sentence cruel and unusual. 
II. OVERVIEW OF R. V. FERGUSON 
Ferguson16 involved the shooting death of a detainee by an Alberta 
RCMP officer. Moments after escorting him into a cell, the officer shot 
the victim twice, once in the abdomen and a second time, fatally, in the 
head. The victim was intoxicated and there was a scuffle between the 
two men before the two shots were fired at an interval of up to three 
seconds. The officer was charged with second degree murder but a jury 
convicted him of manslaughter. Though manslaughter with a firearm 
carries a mandatory minimum sentence of four years’ imprisonment,17 
the sentencing judge found that that sentence would be cruel and unusual 
in the circumstances and granted a constitutional exemption, imposing a 
conditional sentence of two years less a day. The Court of Appeal 
allowed the appeal and imposed the mandatory four-year sentence.  
Before the Supreme Court, the defence did not argue that the 
mandatory minimum sentence for manslaughter with a firearm should be 
struck down,18 but only that the accused should be exempted from its 
application. The defence contended that the four-year minimum was 
constitutional in most applications, but that courts should decline to 
apply it in those rare cases where it would lead to an unconstitutional 
punishment.19 Writing for the unanimous court, McLachlin C.J.C. 
rejected this argument and dismissed the appeal. She found that the 
mandatory minimum sentence was not cruel and unusual in the 
circumstances. The trial judge’s finding that the sentence was grossly 
disproportionate was based on errors underlying his view of the facts,20 
                                                                                                             
16
 Supra, note 12. 
17
 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 236(a) [hereinafter “Criminal Code”]. 
18
 Such an argument would have encountered the difficulty that the Supreme Court upheld 
the same minimum sentence for the closely related offence of criminal negligence causing death 
with a firearm in Morrisey, supra, note 10. See Ferguson, supra, note 12, at para. 11. 
19
 In making this claim, the defence adopted reasoning from the concurring judgment of 
Arbour J. in Morrisey, supra, note 10, at paras. 66, 94. 
20
 Because the jury convicted the accused of manslaughter, the trial judge properly 
concluded the jury must have rejected both the defence claim that the officer shot the victim in self-
defence and the Crown’s contention that the officer acted with the requisite intent for murder. 
However, according to McLachlin C.J.C., the trial judge erred when he tried to reconstruct the 
jury’s reasoning process and when he found facts inconsistent with the jury’s verdict and contrary to 
the evidence. According to the trial judge, the jury must have concluded that the accused officer 
fired the first shot in self-defence and that the second shot was an instantaneous and instinctive 
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and once these errors were set aside there was no basis for such a 
finding.  
Although it was not necessary to resolve the issue, McLachlin C.J.C. 
went on to hold that constitutional exemptions are not available to 
remedy violations of section 12. The Chief Justice presented four 
reasons. First, after reviewing the conflicting case law on constitutional 
exemptions, she concluded that the weight of authority lies against them. 
Second, she reasoned that to grant a constitutional exemption from a 
mandatory minimum sentence would intrude into the legislative sphere 
by effectively giving sentencing judges discretion in the face of 
mandatory legislation aimed specifically at supplanting judicial discretion. 
Third, she argued that constitutional exemptions are inconsistent with 
the remedial scheme laid out in sections 24(1) and 52(1) of the Charter,21 
under which unconstitutional laws must be struck down pursuant to 
section 52(1) and not “left on the books subject to discretionary case-by-
case remedies”.22 Finally, McLachlin C.J.C. reasoned that to grant 
constitutional exemptions from mandatory sentencing provisions would 
undermine the rule of law by introducing uncertainty about whether 
statutory law applies in a given case. Having rejected the option of 
constitutional exemptions, the Court concluded that any mandatory 
minimum sentence that creates an unconstitutional result under section 
12 should be struck down. 
III. MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES AND THE CHARTER 
The constitutional exemptions question resolved in Ferguson 
engages some larger questions about section 12. Since Ferguson leaves 
striking down as the only remedy for mandatory sentences that violate 
section 12, one can hardly grasp the implications of the decision without 
some appreciation of the phenomenon of mandatory minimum sentences 
and their relationship to the Charter guarantee against cruel and unusual 
                                                                                                             
response to his police training. In the view of McLachlin C.J.C., the trial judge’s view of the second 
shot was inconsistent with the jury’s rejection of self-defence and contrary to the evidence that there 
was an interval between the two shots. 
21
 Section 24(1) of the Charter provides: “Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed 
by this Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to 
obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.” Section 52(1) 
provides: “The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is 
inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force 
or effect.” 
22
 Ferguson, supra, note 12, at para. 65. 
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punishment. To provide the necessary context, I will review, first, the 
status of minimum sentences in Canada and, second, the broader 
contours of the section 12 analysis. 
1. Mandatory Minimum Sentences in Canada 
By imposing a mandatory minimum sentence, the legislator reduces 
or eliminates the role of judicial discretion in sentencing for a particular 
offence. A mandatory minimum sentence establishes a floor that limits 
the options of the sentencing judge, who may be entitled to impose a 
harsher penalty than that stipulated in the statute, but is precluded from 
imposing a lighter one.23 Minimum sentences are the exception to the 
rule in Canada, where the vast majority of offences carry no minimum 
penalty and sentencing is typically individualized. Still, there are dozens 
of minimum sentences in the Criminal Code and their numbers have 
been increasing rapidly in recent years.24 As of 2006, about 40 Criminal 
Code offences carried minimum terms of imprisonment, including first 
and second degree murder, numerous firearms and weapons offences, 
various sexual offences involving children and a few impaired driving 
offences.25 Most of the minimum sentences attached to firearms offences 
and sexual offences involving children were introduced in 1995 and 
2005, respectively.26 The federal Tackling Violent Crime Act, which 
passed into law in February 2008, increases existing minimum sentences 
for firearms and impaired driving offences and introduces escalating 
minimum penalties for repeat firearms offences.27  
Politicians appear to support mandatory minimum sentences because 
they send a tough crime control message that appeals to voters.28 More 
principled arguments have also been advanced in favour of mandatory 
                                                                                                             
23
 Elizabeth Sheehy, “Mandatory Minimum Sentences: Law and Policy” (2001) 39 
Osgoode Hall L.J. 261, at 261 [hereinafter “Sheehy”]. 
24
 See Nicole Crutcher, “The Legislative History of Mandatory Minimum Penalties of 
Imprisonment in Canada” (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 273 (reviewing the minimum sentences of 
imprisonment introduced in Canada until 2001, and noting that such sentences have progressively 
become more common). 
25
 Parliamentary Information and Research Service, Mandatory Minimum Sentences by 





 Tackling Violent Crime Act, S.C. 2008, c. 6. 
28
 Anthony N. Doob & Carla Cesaroni, “The Political Attractiveness of Mandatory 
Minimum Sentences” (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 287 [hereinafter “Doob & Cesaroni”]. 
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minimum sentences: they are said to contribute to crime control by 
deterring or incapacitating offenders, and to reduce disparities in 
sentencing.29 But the available evidence indicates that mandatory 
minimum sentences are generally ineffective in controlling crime.30 
Moreover, mandatory minimum sentences that involve substantial terms 
of imprisonment are known to invite evasion by justice system officials, 
to shift sentencing discretion from judges to prosecutors, to increase 
incarceration rates and result in the unnecessary incarceration of 
offenders who pose no threat to society, to exacerbate systemic 
discrimination when they are imposed disproportionately on racialized 
accused, and to cause a host of other ill effects in the criminal justice 
system.31 Consequently, mandatory minimum sentences have been widely 
condemned by academic commentators and policy commissions.32  
There are a number of reasons to conclude that mandatory minimum 
sentences represent an unwise policy choice, but it is their potential to 
result in grossly disproportionate sentences that raises Charter concerns. 
The Criminal Code identifies proportionality as the fundamental 
principle of sentencing: “A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity 
of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.”33 
Because they preclude individualized consideration of these matters, 
mandatory sentences strain against this overarching principle.34 An 
overview of the leading Supreme Court judgments on section 12 will 
                                                                                                             
29
 Department of Justice Canada, Mandatory Minimum Penalties: Their Effects on Crime, 
Sentencing Disparities, and Justice System Expenditures by Thomas Gabor & Nicole Crutcher 
(Ottawa: Research and Statistics Division, 2002) at 1, online at: <http://justice.gc.ca/eng/pi/rs/rep-
rap/2002/rr02_1/rr02_1.pdf> [hereinafter “Department of Justice Canada”]. 
30
 See Doob & Cesaroni, supra, note 28, at 291 (“[M]andatory minimum sentences do not 
deter more than less harsh, proportionate, sentences.”); Department of Justice Canada, id., at 29-32 
(reviewing research on mandatory minimum sentences in various offence categories and finding 
little evidence that any of them were effective in controlling crime). But see Thomas Gabor, 
“Mandatory Minimum Sentences: A Utilitarian Perspective” (2001) Can. J. Crim. 384, at 389 
[hereinafter “Gabor”] (cautioning against generalizing about the effects of mandatory minimum 
sentences, which apply to various types of offences and range in severity from temporary licence 
suspensions to life imprisonment). 
31
 See Department of Justice Canada, supra, note 29; Athar K. Malik, “Mandatory 
Minimum Sentences: Shackling Judicial Discretion for Justice or Political Expediency?” (2007) 53 
Crim. L.Q. 236, at 241-54; Gabor, id., at 392-400; Doob & Cesaroni, supra, note 28, at 293-97. 
32
 Sheehy, supra, note 23, at 262-64 (noting the dearth of academic literature supporting 
mandatory minimum sentences and the strong critiques of such sentences from the Canadian 
Sentencing Commission, the Law Reform Commission of Canada, and other policymaking bodies). 
33
 Criminal Code, s. 718.1. 
34
 For example, Morris J. Fish, “An Eye for an Eye: Proportionality as a Moral Principle of 
Punishment” (2008) 28 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 57, at 69. 
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reveal the constitutional implications of this potential for disproportionality 
in sentencing.35 
2. Section 12 Jurisprudence 
The foundational case on section 12 is R. v. Smith,36 which struck 
down a minimum sentence of seven years’ imprisonment for importing 
any amount of narcotics as a violation of section 12 that could not be 
saved under section 1. Significantly, it was not argued that the minimum 
sentence would be cruel and unusual in the circumstances of the accused, 
a repeat offender who had imported a large amount of cocaine. Instead, 
the section 12 argument was based on the notion that the minimum 
sentence was overly broad and would capture a sympathetic hypothetical 
offender for whom the punishment would be cruel and unusual: a 
youthful first-time offender caught importing a single marijuana joint. 
Writing for a plurality of judges, Lamer J. held that section 12 prohibits 
“grossly disproportionate” punishments that are “so excessive as to 
outrage the standards of decency”.37 Since Smith, gross disproportionality 
has been the hallmark of the section 12 analysis. 
In R. v. Goltz,38 the Supreme Court elaborated on how hypothetical 
circumstances could be considered in the section 12 analysis. Goltz 
concerned a constitutional challenge to a provision in a provincial statute 
that imposed a mandatory minimum sentence of seven days’ 
imprisonment for knowingly driving while prohibited. Writing for a 
majority of the Court, Gonthier J. divided the section 12 analysis into 
two steps. First, a court should consider whether the challenged penalty 
would be grossly disproportionate for the offender before it, given the 
circumstances of the offence and the offender. Second, if the punishment 
would not be grossly disproportionate on the facts of the case, the court 
should consider whether the challenged penalty would be grossly 
disproportionate in “reasonable hypothetical circumstances, as opposed 
to far-fetched or marginally imaginable cases”.39 Applying this two-step 
analysis to the penalty and the offence before it, the majority found that 
mandatory minimum sentence did not infringe section 12. 
                                                                                                             
35
 For a more detailed review of the cases, see Kent Roach, “Searching for Smith: The 
Constitutionality of Mandatory Sentences” (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 367, at 372-81. 
36
 [1987] S.C.J. No. 36, 34 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.). 
37
 Id., at 139. 
38
 [1991] S.C.J. No. 90, 67 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (S.C.C.). 
39
 Id., at 497. 
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A final case that sheds light on the method of analyzing mandatory 
minimum sentences under section 12 is R. v. Morrisey.40 The accused, a 
remorseful first-time offender, was convicted of criminal negligence 
causing death after he jumped onto a bunk bed while intoxicated and 
holding a loaded rifle, fell, and accidentally discharged the rifle at a 
friend who was lying on the top bunk. Because the offence was 
committed with a firearm, a mandatory minimum sentence of four years’ 
imprisonment applied.41 Despite sympathetic facts, the defence conceded 
that the minimum sentence would not be grossly disproportionate as 
applied to the particular offender, so the section 12 challenge turned on 
the hypothetical analysis laid out in Goltz.42 Once again, Gonthier J. 
wrote for a majority of the Supreme Court, upholding the mandatory 
minimum sentence under section 12. Gonthier J. emphasized that “courts 
are to consider only those hypotheticals that could reasonably arise”,43 
explained that the hypotheticals considered should be “common”44 and 
dismissed various reported cases as “marginal” situations that should be 
excluded from the analysis.45 Despite having conceded that criminal 
negligence causing death “can be committed in an almost infinite variety 
of ways”,46 Gonthier J. considered that there were only two types of 
common situations meriting consideration as reasonable hypotheticals: 
individuals playing with firearms and hunting accidents. In neither case, 
the majority held, would the four-year minimum sentence be grossly 
disproportionate. 
Justice Arbour delivered a concurring judgment in Morrisey 
disagreeing with the majority’s analysis of hypothetical cases. In the 
view of Arbour J., to limit the analysis to “two generic situations” 
conflicted with the nature of the offence of criminal negligence causing 
death, which could be committed in a wide variety of ways.47 Moreover, 
she argued that real past cases should not be excluded from the 
reasonable hypotheticals analysis, even if their facts seemed unusual. In 
light of the range of circumstances in which the offence had arisen in the 
past, Arbour J. considered it inevitable that cases would arise in which 
                                                                                                             
40
 [2000] S.C.J. No. 39, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90 (S.C.C.). 
41
 Criminal Code, s. 220(a). 
42
 Supra, note 38. 
43
 Morrisey, supra, note 40, at para. 33 (emphasis in original). 
44
 Id., at para. 33.  
45
 Id., at paras. 32 and 50. 
46
 Id., at para. 31. 
47
 Id., at para. 64. 
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the four-year minimum sentence would be grossly disproportionate. 
However, instead of striking down the mandatory minimum, Arbour J. 
would have upheld the sentencing provision “generally, while declining 
to apply it in a future case” where the sentence would be grossly 
disproportionate.48 In essence, Arbour J. endorsed the use of a constitutional 
exemption in an exceptional future case. Of course, Ferguson49 has now 
ruled out this proposed solution to the problem of the exceptional case.  
IV. THE CONTINUING PROBLEM OF THE EXCEPTIONAL CASE 
What, then, is to be done about exceptional cases? The problem 
requires resolution if we accept, as did Arbour J. in Morrisey,50 that 
unusual cases will occasionally arise where mandatory minimum 
sentences that generally apply in a constitutional manner produce cruel 
and unusual punishments for particular individuals. This potential to 
create grossly disproportionate sentences inheres in mandatory minimums, 
which by their nature efface distinctions between cases,51 and increases 
with the range of conduct covered by the offence and the harshness of 
the minimum penalty. It is, of course, impossible to predict the future 
circumstances of offenders and offences within which mandatory 
minimum sentences will give rise to instances of gross disproportionality.52 
Yet one can easily imagine cases in which some of Canada’s mandatory 
minimum sentencing laws would impose cruel and unusual punishments.  
Compassionate homicides provide an obvious example. A loving 
spouse or adult child who kills a terminally ill and suffering family 
member could, if the killing was planned and deliberate, be guilty of first 
degree murder and be subjected to a mandatory sentence of life in 
prison without the possibility of parole for 25 years.53 The consent of the 
                                                                                                             
48
 Id., at para. 66. 
49
 [2008] S.C.J. No. 6, 2008 SCC 6 (S.C.C.). 
50
 Supra, note 40, at para. 82. 
51
 See Allan Manson, “Motivation, the Supreme Court and Mandatory Sentencing for 
Murder” (2001) 39 C.R. (5th) 65, at 71 (“By submerging individual characteristics and the infinite 
circumstances in which offences can be committed into a uniform mould, the mandated sentence 
will inevitably produce at least some unfair and inordinately harsh responses.”). 
52
 See Kumar, [1993] B.C.J. No. 2266, 85 C.C.C. (3d) 417, at para. 53 (B.C.C.A.). 
53
 The mandatory sentencing provisions appear in ss. 235(1) and 745 of the Criminal Code. 
Several real Canadian cases of compassionate killings, some with the victim’s consent, are 
discussed in the dissenting reasons of Bayda C.J.S. in R. v. Latimer, [1995] S.J. No. 402, 99 C.C.C. 
(3d) 481, at 531-39 (Sask. C.A.). In all these cases the accused pleaded guilty to lesser offences and 
non-custodial sentences were imposed.  
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victim, which seems important to the killer’s moral culpability,54 would 
provide no legal excuse.55 The mandatory punishment appears grossly 
disproportionate in these foreseeable circumstances, but the Supreme 
Court has held that these sentencing provisions are consistent with 
section 12.56  
Existing mandatory sentences for offences involving firearms and 
other weapons also seem apt to create occasional injustices. For 
example, a youthful and naïve martial arts enthusiast who returned from 
vacation with a souvenir set of nunchucks could be subjected to the one-
year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment for knowingly 
importing a prohibited weapon.57 And as the discussion of Morrisey58 
revealed, the offence of criminal negligence causing death can be 
committed in circumstances approximating a tragic accident, but when it 
is committed with a firearm it attracts a mandatory minimum sentence of 
four years’ imprisonment.59 In sum, mandatory minimum sentences raise 
a possibility of grossly disproportionate sentences in a variety of factual 
circumstances.60 
Accepting, then, that exceptional cases present a problem in the 
context of mandatory minimum sentences, I will now consider whether 
and how Ferguson61 contributes to a solution. First, it is argued that the 
Court lost an opportunity in Ferguson to craft a sensible solution by 
recognizing constitutional exemptions. Second, the problem of the 
exceptional case is identified as a matter of overbreadth, and the 
competing approaches to remedying overbreadth are discussed. Finally, I 
                                                                                                             
54
 Coupled with the fact that the victim was the accused’s vulnerable disabled child, the 
absence of the victim’s consent weighed in favour of the Supreme Court’s conclusion that the 
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will argue that, in the context of the section 12 jurisprudence, Ferguson 
creates a gap in the protection offered by this Charter guarantee. 
1. The Lost Opportunity of Constitutional Exemptions 
By rejecting constitutional exemptions in Ferguson, the Supreme 
Court of Canada has foreclosed a workable solution to the problem of 
the exceptional case. As McLachlin C.J.C. pointed out, the primary 
benefits of a constitutional exemption remedy are that exemptions 
introduce some desirable flexibility into the constitutional analysis and 
offer courts a way to preserve legislation that is constitutional in its 
general application.62 On examination, these benefits undercut some of 
the criticisms levelled at constitutional exemptions in Ferguson.  
The Chief Justice reasoned that recognizing constitutional 
exemptions within the context of mandatory minimum sentences would 
undermine the legislative intent underlying such provisions, which is to 
exclude judicial discretion.63 This argument suffers from two 
weaknesses. First, it relies on the dubious assumption that blind rigidity 
in sentencing constitutes a constitutionally valid legislative objective to 
which courts must defer. Second, this legislative deference argument 
reflects an implausible and uncharitable reading of Parliament’s intent. 
The Court’s reasons suggest that Parliament’s primary objective in 
enacting mandatory minimum sentences is to exclude judicial discretion 
in every case without exception: to ensure that, for sentencing purposes, 
exceptional cases receive the same treatment as ordinary cases. On this 
view, catching cases with unusual facts becomes a central feature of the 
legislative intent.  
Would it not be more reasonable to conclude that Parliament’s main 
objective in passing a mandatory minimum sentence is to set a new, 
tougher standard of punishment for the offence as a whole?64 This 
understanding of the legislative purpose finds support in the public 
discourse surrounding mandatory sentences, in which legislators and 
others emphasize the potential for mandatory sentences to enhance 
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public safety by “getting tough” on crime.65 Understood thus, the 
legislative intent driving mandatory minimums seems congruent with the 
possibility of constitutional exemptions, which could vindicate the aims 
of the legislation by ensuring that tough minimum sentences would be 
applied in the great majority of cases. Arguably, then, the course of 
legislative deference lies not in rejecting constitutional exemptions but in 
embracing them as a mechanism for preserving legislation.66  
Chief Justice McLachlin’s claim that constitutional exemptions are 
inconsistent with the remedial scheme of the Charter67 is also questionable. 
Admittedly there has been some confusion about whether constitutional 
exemptions (if they existed) should be grounded in section 52(1) or 
section 24(1) of the Charter.68 Laying aside that complex and technical 
issue, however, constitutional exemptions appear consistent with the 
flexible approach to remedies that has developed under the Charter. In 
Schachter v. Canada,69 the Supreme Court discussed the constitutional 
remedies of severance and reading in, explaining that their purpose “is to 
be as faithful as possible within the requirements of the Constitution to 
the scheme enacted by the legislature.”70 The same argument applies to 
constitutional exemptions, which as explained above can be used to 
preserve legislation. The mere fact that constitutional exemptions change 
or mitigate the effects of the legislation is no reason to rule out the 
remedy. Any change goes only so far as to ensure compliance with 
Charter standards.71 
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2. Approaches to Overbreadth 
The implications of Ferguson72 must be considered in the context of 
the evolving section 12 jurisprudence. Since the early days of the 
Charter, the Supreme Court has consistently held that mandatory 
minimum sentences are not inherently cruel and unusual,73 but its 
approach to the problem has shifted over time. As Kent Roach has 
observed, the Supreme Court has become progressively more deferential 
to legislative choices imposing mandatory minimum sentences.74 The 
Court’s willingness to find violations of section 12 in hypothetical cases 
— once robust in Smith75 — has been winnowed down in Goltz76 and 
Morrisey77 to the extent that it now provides little scope to challenge the 
constitutionality of these punishments.78 And like the narrowing of the 
reasonable hypotheticals analysis, the rejection of constitutional 
exemptions in Ferguson forms a part of this larger deferential trend. 
Thus, these two movements in the section 12 jurisprudence — the 
narrowing of the reasonable hypotheticals analysis and the elimination of 
constitutional exemptions — appear broadly consistent. 
Unfortunately, taken together, these two movements create a problem 
in the section 12 analysis. Properly understood, constitutional exemptions 
and the reasonable hypotheticals analysis represent competing approaches 
to controlling legislative overbreadth.79 Commentators have frequently 
observed that the availability of constitutional exemptions makes it seem 
unnecessary to strike down laws under the reasonable hypotheticals 
                                                                                                             
72
 Supra, note 49. 
73
 Latimer, supra, note 54, at para. 88; Goltz, [1991] S.C.J. No. 90, 67 C.C.C. (3d) 481, at 
495 (S.C.C.); Smith, [1987] S.C.J. No. 36, 34 C.C.C. (3d) 97, at 143 (S.C.C.). 
74
 Kent Roach, “Searching for Smith: The Constitutionality of Mandatory Sentences” 
(2001) 39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 367, at 369, 372, 383 [hereinafter “Roach, ‘Searching for Smith’”]. 
75
 Supra, note 73. 
76
 Supra, note 73. 
77
 [2000] S.C.J. No. 39, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90 (S.C.C.). 
78
 See Don Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law, 4th ed. (Toronto: Thomson 
Carswell, 2005), at 454 [hereinafter “Stuart”]; Allan Manson, “Morrisey: Observations on Criminal 
Negligence and s. 12 Methodology” (2000) 36 C.R. (5th) 121, at 124. 
79
 See Robert Frater, “The Sharpe Edge of the Corbiere Wedge: Are ‘Reasonable 
Hypotheticals’ Still Reasonable?” (1999) 25 C.R. (5th) 307, at 308. Mandatory minimum sentences 
can be overly broad in the sense that, even when they generally produce proportionate results, they 
can operate in exceptional cases to produce grossly disproportionate sentences. This notion of 
overbreadth under s. 12 is distinct from the issue of overly broad offence provisions, which can give 
rise to violations of s. 7 of the Charter (“Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the 
person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice.”); R. v. Heywood, [1994] S.C.J. No. 101, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761 (S.C.C.) (striking 
down an overly broad offence provision under s. 7). 
(2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES 473 
analysis, while a robust approach to reasonable hypotheticals reduces the 
attraction of constitutional exemptions.80 This complementarity arises 
because reasonable hypotheticals analysis and constitutional exemptions 
have the same function: to provide a remedy for the exceptional case. 
After Ferguson,81 the pressing question is what to do with exceptional 
cases when neither remedy is available. 
Commentators have pointed out that constitutional exemptions seem 
consistent with an American approach to constitutional review that holds 
laws to be invalid “as applied” to individual claimants; reasonable 
hypotheticals analysis, by contrast, conforms to the Canadian approach 
under which the normal remedy is to strike down unconstitutional laws.82 
Thus, some have argued that constitutional exemptions are both inconsistent 
with the approach to judicial review under the Charter and, in light of the 
availability hypothetical analysis, unnecessary:  
In Canada, … extensive use of reasonable hypotheticals, unfettered by 
issues of standing, allows for a fulsome scrutiny of a provision’s 
validity in light of a myriad possible applications.83 
The logic of the argument is undeniable, but there is an obvious 
problem: under section 12, “extensive use of reasonable hypotheticals” 
is no longer permitted. After Goltz84 and Morrisey,85 reasonable 
hypotheticals must be common, which seems to rule out any consideration 
of exceptional circumstances.86 
An example from the case law might prove instructive. In R. v. 
Kumar,87 the British Columbia Court of Appeal considered a section 12 
challenge to the 14-day mandatory minimum term of imprisonment that 
attaches to a second drinking and driving offence.88 For a majority of the 
court, Taylor J.A. held that the provision could not be struck down using 
the reasonable hypotheticals analysis because the situations in which the 
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punishment would be grossly disproportionate, though they existed, 
would be “rare”.89 However, Taylor J.A. found comfort in the fact that a 
constitutional exemption would be available if and when such a rare case 
arose.90 However, that source of comfort is no longer available. Now that 
the Supreme Court has ruled out the constitutional exemptions under 
section 12, the problem of the exceptional case is more perplexing than 
ever. 
3. The Gap in Section 12 Protection 
Peter Sankoff has explained that, if constitutional exemptions are not 
available, courts have three options when confronted with a law that is 
constitutional in most applications but infringes section 12 in rare 
instances: first, to offer no remedy to those rare individuals whose 
Charter rights are infringed; second, to broaden the reasonable 
hypotheticals analysis to encompass exceptional cases; or third, to 
permit reconsideration of precedents upholding the constitutionality of 
the law and thereby allow the law to be struck down when an 
exceptional case emerges.91 The first option — providing no remedy — 
seems unacceptable because it would leave individuals without any way 
of enforcing their Charter rights. For this reason, Sankoff considered it 
“virtually inconceivable that this approach would be adopted”.92 
Certainly no court in Canada would ever explicitly endorse this option, 
but one cannot ignore the possibility that, in practice, Charter claimants 
may be left without a remedy when their section 12 rights are violated in 
exceptional cases. When the obstacles facing the other options are 
considered, the disturbing possibility emerges that offering no remedy to 
the exceptional section 12 claimant represents the path of least resistance. 
The second option — broadening the reasonable hypotheticals 
analysis to encompass exceptional cases — appears unavailable until 
such time as the Supreme Court opts to reconsider its analysis in Goltz93 
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and Morrisey.94 Such reconsideration seems unlikely in light of the fact 
that the unanimous Court relies extensively on these cases in Ferguson.95 
Since there is clear authority from the Supreme Court of Canada that 
hypotheticals must be common, it is not open to a lower court to broaden 
the analysis.  
The third option — permitting courts to reconsider prior cases 
upholding the constitutionality of the law in light of new facts — seems 
to be the only real choice.96 This option would require a judge to strike 
down a mandatory minimum sentence, even one that has previously 
survived a section 12 challenge, when the accused before the court 
would otherwise be subjected to a grossly disproportionate sentence. 
There is language in Ferguson97 to support this result. The Chief Justice 
rejected the suggestion that  
no remedy is available in the case of a mandatory minimum sentence 
that brings about an unconstitutional result — for instance, in 
circumstances not previously considered as part of a reasonable 
hypotheticals analysis. If a mandatory minimum sentence would create 
an unconstitutional result in a particular case, the minimum sentence 
must be struck down.98 
At first blush, this simple statement seems to answer all possible 
objections, but serious problems emerge on closer examination.  
On the basis of this brief passage, can we really expect lower court 
judges faced with exceptional cases to disregard prior decisions on the 
constitutionality of mandatory minimum sentences? The Supreme Court 
of Canada has upheld the mandatory minimum sentences for murder99 
and criminal negligence causing death with a firearm,100 even though 
there are imaginable circumstances where these penalties would be cruel 
and unusual. In the face of these apparently binding precedents, is it 
realistic to think a judge will strike down those mandatory minimum 
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punishments when a uniquely sympathetic case comes to court?101 
Ultimately, the suggestion that the constitutionality of mandatory 
minimum sentences can be reconsidered in light of new facts represents 
a more radical challenge to the principle of stare decisis than the 
Supreme Court appears to have appreciated. More than a passing 
reference from the Court is needed to ensure that claimants in 
exceptional cases have a remedy when a mandatory minimum sentence 
imposes cruel and unusual punishment.  
To complicate matters further, certain parts of the judgment in 
Ferguson contradict the idea that decisions on section 12 issues are open 
to re-examination in novel circumstances. One reason the Chief Justice 
offered for rejecting constitutional exemptions is that “[t]he matter of 
constitutionality would not be resolved once and for all as under 
s. 52(1)”.102 This passage implies that rulings on the constitutionality of 
mandatory minimum sentences under section 12 are final and binding. 
But if we accept that a minimum sentence can be struck down if it would 
be cruel and unusual punishment on the facts, then section 12 rulings are 
only final in the rare cases when they strike the law down. Decisions 
upholding mandatory minimums, on the other hand, should always be 
open to reconsideration in light of novel circumstances. The Chief 
Justice’s reference to resolving section 12 issues “once and for all” 
draws no apparent distinction between successful and unsuccessful 
Charter challenges, and arguably undermines the notion that decisions 
upholding mandatory sentences can be reconsidered. Moreover, the 
Court referred elsewhere in Ferguson to the precedential value of 
Morrisey on the constitutionality of the minimum sentence for 
manslaughter with a firearm;103 Morrisey upheld the constitutionality of a 
mandatory minimum sentence, yet the Court in Ferguson treated it as a 
binding precedent. Thus, Ferguson sends mixed messages about whether 
section 12 rulings can be reconsidered and how judges should respond to 
exceptional cases. 
Quite apart from the question of finality, there are problems with 
leaving section 12 cases perpetually open for reconsideration. If courts 
must wait for the exceptional case before striking down a mandatory 
minimum that has unconstitutional effects, then overly broad mandatory 
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sentences may stay on the books indefinitely. And leaving overly broad 
laws on the books has important costs. Of course, the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion may mean that the most sympathetic offenders 
are likely never to be charged. But unfettered prosecutorial discretion 
hardly constitutes an adequate guarantee of constitutional rights. 
Moreover, if courts must wait until the exceptional claimant appears 
before them to strike down overly broad mandatory minimum sentences, 
then prosecutors have the power to insulate laws from constitutional 
scrutiny by declining to press exceptional cases.  
The fundamental problem is that the persistence of an invalid 
mandatory minimum sentence has distorting effects.104 Accused persons 
may feel pressure to plead guilty to lesser offences to avoid the possible 
application of an overly broad mandatory minimum.105 In embracing a 
robust approach to the analysis of hypotheticals in Smith,106 the Supreme 
Court suggested that an accused is entitled to have the sentencing issue 
decided without regard to a mandatory minimum sentence that is 
constitutionally infirm.107 This objection merits consideration before 
Sankoff’s third option (permitting courts to reconsider the 
constitutionality of sentencing laws in light of new fact situations) is 
clearly and finally adopted. 
Taken together, the Supreme Court’s section 12 judgments leave a 
potential gap in the protection offered by this Charter guarantee. Given 
the strict limits on the reasonable hypotheticals analysis and the 
unavailability of constitutional exemptions, a possibility exists that a 
Charter applicant will be left without a remedy when a mandatory 
minimum sentence that is generally constitutional has unconstitutional 
effects. Recognizing this possibility as unacceptable does not make it 
any less real.108 
                                                                                                             
104
 See Smith, [1987] S.C.J. No. 36, 34 C.C.C. (3d) 97, at 124 (S.C.C.). 
105
 See, e.g., Kent Roach, Constitutional Remedies in Canada (Aurora, ON: Canada Law 
Book, 2006), at 382-83. This phenomenon has been observed among battered women who kill; 
often such women forego legitimate self-defence claims and plead guilty to manslaughter for fear of 
the prospect of being imprisoned for life for murder. See Elizabeth Sheehy, “Battered Women and 
Mandatory Minimum Sentences” (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 529, at 539. 
106
 Smith, supra, note 104. 
107
 See especially Smith, id., at 150, per LeDain J., concurring. 
108
 The potential for this gap in s. 12 protection has been noted before. See Allan Manson, 
“Morrisey: Observations on Criminal Negligence and s. 12 Methodology” (2006) 36 C.R. (5th) 121, 
at 128 (“What is essential is to ensure that courts are not forced by methodological precedent to 
stand passive in the face of s. 12 violations.”); Don Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal 
Law, 4th ed. (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2005), at 454, arguing that the Supreme Court in 
Morrisey was “pre-empting challenges in worse cases arising in the future”. 
478 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
V. CONCLUSION 
Ferguson109 creates problems by hiving off the constitutional 
exemption question from the broader section 12 analysis. Once the case 
is considered in its jurisprudential context, it becomes clear that the 
problem of the exceptional case demands further guidance from the 
Supreme Court. If the Court envisions lower courts striking down 
mandatory minimum sentences despite higher court decisions upholding 
them, then that expectation should be made explicit. If, on the other 
hand, the Court considers that exceptional cases are best incorporated 
into the reasonable hypotheticals analysis, then the narrow approach laid 
out in Goltz110 and Morrisey111 must be discarded and a more generous 
section 12 methodology adopted. My own view is that the latter course is 
preferable, but clear guidance in either direction would be preferable to 
the current state of uncertainty. As the law stands, section 12 may fail to 
protect individuals in exceptional circumstances.  
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